This thesis analyzes hypothesis-making reasoning, namely abduction, in the context of scientific discovery. My central question is: "what is the role of information in the generation of new explanatory hypotheses?”. To answer this question, firstly, inspired by Peircean philosophy and semiotics, I characterize information as a process. Secondly, I discuss the concept of abduction, in the light of the informational process, claiming that abduction is a dynamic goal-directed reasoning being crucial for scientific discovery. Thirdly, I introduce the notion of styles of scientific thinking and doing based on Crombie and Hacking’s works. I argue that styles are strategical resources that enable and constrain the formulation of new hypotheses through abductive reasoning. To clarify my approach, I analyze examples of scientific discovery drawn from the history of science. Finally, I conclude by presenting the main achievements of the present study in the context of history and philosophy of science.