In the opening of his logic, Hegel famously claims to have established the absolute beginning of philosophy with pure being, which subsequently unfolds itself as self-negating negativity. Strikingly, this absolute beginning is prefaced not only with a foreword and an introduction. Hegel’s logic is, in fact, also situated within a scrutiny that, on the one hand, systematically examines the necessary constituents of an absolute beginning, and, on the other, establishes such a beginning via this examination. The absolute beginning of the logic (logos) is thusly situated in a preface (prologos), which, according to Hegel, has been sublated, when the logic begins. In one aspect however, the prologue to the logic from 1812 differs from the posthumously published edition from 1832. While Hegel in the 1812-logic describes this transition in terms of a necessary exteriorisation (Entäußerung), the transition is furthermore described in terms of a decision and a will (Entschluss) in the 1832-logic. Hegel, the article argues, alters his conception of an absolute beginning after 1812. Consequently, he approaches the question of an absolute beginning in two distinct ways, which, it is further argued, need to be differentiated properly for an adequate understanding of his system and its immediate reception. The article traces and examines these two models of situating being and, thus, self-negating negativity in the logic. By following the historical development of Hegel’s thought in his works and lectures, the article ultimately aims to highlight a crucial aspect of the function and necessity of prologues within classical German philosophy