How to recognize intruders in your niche
Publikation: Bidrag til bog/antologi/rapport › Bidrag til bog/antologi › Forskning
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How to recognize intruders in your niche. / Andersen, Hanne.
The Way Through Science and Philosophy: Essays in Honour of Stig Andur Pedersen. red. / HB Andersen; FV Christiansen; KF Jørgensen; V Hendricks. London : College Publications, 2006. s. 119-136.Publikation: Bidrag til bog/antologi/rapport › Bidrag til bog/antologi › Forskning
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TY - CHAP
T1 - How to recognize intruders in your niche
AU - Andersen, Hanne
PY - 2006
Y1 - 2006
N2 - One important problem concerning incommensurability is how to explain that two theories which are incommensurable and therefore mutually untranslatable and incomparable in a strictly logical, point-by-point way are still competing. The two standard approaches have been to argue either that the terms of incommensurable theories may share reference, or that incommensurable theories target roughly the same object domain as far as the world-in-itself is concerned. However, neither of these approaches to the problem pay due respect to the incommensurability thesis' insights. In this paper I shall first show the inconsistency between the basic premises underlying Kuhn’s incommensurability thesis and the two standard responses to the thesis. I shall then argue that if one adopts Kuhn’s position, the response must build on a notion of overlap between phenomenal worlds. Finally, I shall argue that overlap between complex structures of features can provide the basis for such a notion, and that this makes it possible to explain how incommensurable theories may compete.
AB - One important problem concerning incommensurability is how to explain that two theories which are incommensurable and therefore mutually untranslatable and incomparable in a strictly logical, point-by-point way are still competing. The two standard approaches have been to argue either that the terms of incommensurable theories may share reference, or that incommensurable theories target roughly the same object domain as far as the world-in-itself is concerned. However, neither of these approaches to the problem pay due respect to the incommensurability thesis' insights. In this paper I shall first show the inconsistency between the basic premises underlying Kuhn’s incommensurability thesis and the two standard responses to the thesis. I shall then argue that if one adopts Kuhn’s position, the response must build on a notion of overlap between phenomenal worlds. Finally, I shall argue that overlap between complex structures of features can provide the basis for such a notion, and that this makes it possible to explain how incommensurable theories may compete.
M3 - Book chapter
SN - 1-904987-33-8
SP - 119
EP - 136
BT - The Way Through Science and Philosophy: Essays in Honour of Stig Andur Pedersen
A2 - Andersen, HB
A2 - Christiansen, FV
A2 - Jørgensen, KF
A2 - Hendricks, V
PB - College Publications
CY - London
ER -
ID: 137053000