How to recognize intruders in your niche

Publikation: Bidrag til bog/antologi/rapportBidrag til bog/antologiForskning

Standard

How to recognize intruders in your niche. / Andersen, Hanne.

The Way Through Science and Philosophy: Essays in Honour of Stig Andur Pedersen. red. / HB Andersen; FV Christiansen; KF Jørgensen; V Hendricks. London : College Publications, 2006. s. 119-136.

Publikation: Bidrag til bog/antologi/rapportBidrag til bog/antologiForskning

Harvard

Andersen, H 2006, How to recognize intruders in your niche. i HB Andersen, FV Christiansen, KF Jørgensen & V Hendricks (red), The Way Through Science and Philosophy: Essays in Honour of Stig Andur Pedersen. College Publications, London, s. 119-136.

APA

Andersen, H. (2006). How to recognize intruders in your niche. I HB. Andersen, FV. Christiansen, KF. Jørgensen, & V. Hendricks (red.), The Way Through Science and Philosophy: Essays in Honour of Stig Andur Pedersen (s. 119-136). College Publications.

Vancouver

Andersen H. How to recognize intruders in your niche. I Andersen HB, Christiansen FV, Jørgensen KF, Hendricks V, red., The Way Through Science and Philosophy: Essays in Honour of Stig Andur Pedersen. London: College Publications. 2006. s. 119-136

Author

Andersen, Hanne. / How to recognize intruders in your niche. The Way Through Science and Philosophy: Essays in Honour of Stig Andur Pedersen. red. / HB Andersen ; FV Christiansen ; KF Jørgensen ; V Hendricks. London : College Publications, 2006. s. 119-136

Bibtex

@inbook{ada13cbee9824be8baeaff0f99ced30b,
title = "How to recognize intruders in your niche",
abstract = "One important problem concerning incommensurability is how to explain that two theories which are incommensurable and therefore mutually untranslatable and incomparable in a strictly logical, point-by-point way are still competing. The two standard approaches have been to argue either that the terms of incommensurable theories may share reference, or that incommensurable theories target roughly the same object domain as far as the world-in-itself is concerned. However, neither of these approaches to the problem pay due respect to the incommensurability thesis' insights. In this paper I shall first show the inconsistency between the basic premises underlying Kuhn{\textquoteright}s incommensurability thesis and the two standard responses to the thesis. I shall then argue that if one adopts Kuhn{\textquoteright}s position, the response must build on a notion of overlap between phenomenal worlds. Finally, I shall argue that overlap between complex structures of features can provide the basis for such a notion, and that this makes it possible to explain how incommensurable theories may compete.",
author = "Hanne Andersen",
year = "2006",
language = "English",
isbn = "1-904987-33-8",
pages = "119--136",
editor = "HB Andersen and FV Christiansen and KF J{\o}rgensen and V Hendricks",
booktitle = "The Way Through Science and Philosophy: Essays in Honour of Stig Andur Pedersen",
publisher = "College Publications",

}

RIS

TY - CHAP

T1 - How to recognize intruders in your niche

AU - Andersen, Hanne

PY - 2006

Y1 - 2006

N2 - One important problem concerning incommensurability is how to explain that two theories which are incommensurable and therefore mutually untranslatable and incomparable in a strictly logical, point-by-point way are still competing. The two standard approaches have been to argue either that the terms of incommensurable theories may share reference, or that incommensurable theories target roughly the same object domain as far as the world-in-itself is concerned. However, neither of these approaches to the problem pay due respect to the incommensurability thesis' insights. In this paper I shall first show the inconsistency between the basic premises underlying Kuhn’s incommensurability thesis and the two standard responses to the thesis. I shall then argue that if one adopts Kuhn’s position, the response must build on a notion of overlap between phenomenal worlds. Finally, I shall argue that overlap between complex structures of features can provide the basis for such a notion, and that this makes it possible to explain how incommensurable theories may compete.

AB - One important problem concerning incommensurability is how to explain that two theories which are incommensurable and therefore mutually untranslatable and incomparable in a strictly logical, point-by-point way are still competing. The two standard approaches have been to argue either that the terms of incommensurable theories may share reference, or that incommensurable theories target roughly the same object domain as far as the world-in-itself is concerned. However, neither of these approaches to the problem pay due respect to the incommensurability thesis' insights. In this paper I shall first show the inconsistency between the basic premises underlying Kuhn’s incommensurability thesis and the two standard responses to the thesis. I shall then argue that if one adopts Kuhn’s position, the response must build on a notion of overlap between phenomenal worlds. Finally, I shall argue that overlap between complex structures of features can provide the basis for such a notion, and that this makes it possible to explain how incommensurable theories may compete.

M3 - Book chapter

SN - 1-904987-33-8

SP - 119

EP - 136

BT - The Way Through Science and Philosophy: Essays in Honour of Stig Andur Pedersen

A2 - Andersen, HB

A2 - Christiansen, FV

A2 - Jørgensen, KF

A2 - Hendricks, V

PB - College Publications

CY - London

ER -

ID: 137053000