A trilemma for naturalized metaphysics

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A trilemma for naturalized metaphysics. / Jaksland, Rasmus.

I: Ratio, Bind 36, Nr. 1, 2023, s. 1-10.

Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskriftTidsskriftartikelForskningfagfællebedømt

Harvard

Jaksland, R 2023, 'A trilemma for naturalized metaphysics', Ratio, bind 36, nr. 1, s. 1-10. https://doi.org/10.1111/rati.12344

APA

Jaksland, R. (2023). A trilemma for naturalized metaphysics. Ratio, 36(1), 1-10. https://doi.org/10.1111/rati.12344

Vancouver

Jaksland R. A trilemma for naturalized metaphysics. Ratio. 2023;36(1): 1-10. https://doi.org/10.1111/rati.12344

Author

Jaksland, Rasmus. / A trilemma for naturalized metaphysics. I: Ratio. 2023 ; Bind 36, Nr. 1. s. 1-10.

Bibtex

@article{db7f0dd578c54ae09b95e569cf550adf,
title = "A trilemma for naturalized metaphysics",
abstract = "Radical naturalized metaphysics wants to argue (1) that metaphysics without sufficient epistemic warrant should not be pursued, (2) that the traditional methods of metaphysics cannot provide epistemic warrant, (3) that metaphysics using these methods must therefore be discontinued, and (4) that naturalized metaphysics should be pursued instead since (5) such science-based metaphysics succeeds in establishing justified conclusions about ultimate reality. This paper argues that to defend (5), naturalized metaphysics must rely on methods similar to those criticized in (2). If naturalized metaphysics instead opts for the weaker claim that science-based metaphysics is only superior to other metaphysics, then this is insufficient to establish (4). In this case, (4) might therefore be defeated by (1). An alternative is to replace (1) with the view that we should just approach metaphysical questions with the best means available. While this would recommend a science-based approach whenever possible, it would also allow for the continuation of science-independent metaphysics in domains that science has no bearing on and thus reject (3). The paper concludes that none of these alternatives is entirely satisfactory for naturalized metaphysics.",
keywords = "epistemic risk, metametaphysics, naturalism, naturalized metaphysics, philosophy of science",
author = "Rasmus Jaksland",
note = "Publisher Copyright: {\textcopyright} 2022 The Author. Ratio published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd.",
year = "2023",
doi = "10.1111/rati.12344",
language = "English",
volume = "36",
pages = " 1--10",
journal = "Ratio",
issn = "0034-0006",
publisher = "Wiley-Blackwell",
number = "1",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - A trilemma for naturalized metaphysics

AU - Jaksland, Rasmus

N1 - Publisher Copyright: © 2022 The Author. Ratio published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd.

PY - 2023

Y1 - 2023

N2 - Radical naturalized metaphysics wants to argue (1) that metaphysics without sufficient epistemic warrant should not be pursued, (2) that the traditional methods of metaphysics cannot provide epistemic warrant, (3) that metaphysics using these methods must therefore be discontinued, and (4) that naturalized metaphysics should be pursued instead since (5) such science-based metaphysics succeeds in establishing justified conclusions about ultimate reality. This paper argues that to defend (5), naturalized metaphysics must rely on methods similar to those criticized in (2). If naturalized metaphysics instead opts for the weaker claim that science-based metaphysics is only superior to other metaphysics, then this is insufficient to establish (4). In this case, (4) might therefore be defeated by (1). An alternative is to replace (1) with the view that we should just approach metaphysical questions with the best means available. While this would recommend a science-based approach whenever possible, it would also allow for the continuation of science-independent metaphysics in domains that science has no bearing on and thus reject (3). The paper concludes that none of these alternatives is entirely satisfactory for naturalized metaphysics.

AB - Radical naturalized metaphysics wants to argue (1) that metaphysics without sufficient epistemic warrant should not be pursued, (2) that the traditional methods of metaphysics cannot provide epistemic warrant, (3) that metaphysics using these methods must therefore be discontinued, and (4) that naturalized metaphysics should be pursued instead since (5) such science-based metaphysics succeeds in establishing justified conclusions about ultimate reality. This paper argues that to defend (5), naturalized metaphysics must rely on methods similar to those criticized in (2). If naturalized metaphysics instead opts for the weaker claim that science-based metaphysics is only superior to other metaphysics, then this is insufficient to establish (4). In this case, (4) might therefore be defeated by (1). An alternative is to replace (1) with the view that we should just approach metaphysical questions with the best means available. While this would recommend a science-based approach whenever possible, it would also allow for the continuation of science-independent metaphysics in domains that science has no bearing on and thus reject (3). The paper concludes that none of these alternatives is entirely satisfactory for naturalized metaphysics.

KW - epistemic risk

KW - metametaphysics

KW - naturalism

KW - naturalized metaphysics

KW - philosophy of science

U2 - 10.1111/rati.12344

DO - 10.1111/rati.12344

M3 - Journal article

AN - SCOPUS:85133122028

VL - 36

SP - 1

EP - 10

JO - Ratio

JF - Ratio

SN - 0034-0006

IS - 1

ER -

ID: 339998074